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Upon first glance, the relation between Marxism and what has come to 
be labelled ‘communalism’ seems sufficiently outlined by the tag 
‘antagonistic’. Neither is expected to share an appreciable swath of 
common ground with the other. On the contrary, there has been no 
dearth of unequivocal rejection particularly from the communist side. 
Both academic and political Marxism—most notably: the Communist 
Party of India (CPI) and its major splinter products—have ever under-
taken to voice relentless opposition to politicised religion and commu-
nity politics. This seems self-evident. Categories, social notions, and 
the political trajectories of communalist outfits contradict the funda-
mentals of Marxist policy formulation. Most obviously, they posit not 
‘classes’ but mystified ‘religious communities’ as the main actor in 
political and social processes. Still, the antagonism of both also thrives 
on a degree of closeness. In a South Asian context for once, the target 
audiences and the patronising approaches of both to them exhibit 
substantial overlap. And if Marxists and other leftists have time and 
again denounced communalism as an elite project of ideologues 
essentially alien to the ‘masses’, the same is true for their own camp, 
at least from a sociological perspective. — 
 Nevertheless, with political competition thus reinforcing program-
matic divides both currents appear as principally and virtually naturally 
opposed. This is despite the damage done to their reputation as 
staunch proponents of secularism by the partly less than impressive 
post-independence track record of communist parties on the commu-
nal terrain. On the one hand, they remain among the least commu-
nalised political formation—no small feat in an environment where 
avowed secularism often eerily coexists with communal clientelism. On 


























Kerala and North India, and notably the repeated political alignment 
with right-wing Hindu outfits such as the Jan Sangh and Janata Party 
have led some to argue that communist commitment to the cause of 
secularism was lukewarm at best (Raychaudhuri 2010: 41-57; 
Engineer 1986: 18).  
 However, most criticisms levelled at the communists’ lacklustre anti-
communal commitment respect the basic dichotomy of progressive 
secular programs and manifestos and unpleasant realities in the politi-
cal business. Considerations of political gain or mere necessity hence 
figure as detrimental (yet ultimately determining) pulls on an other-
wise firm and clear-minded agenda. In this vein, Thomas Nossiter 
(1985: 232-3) asserts that in the post-independent political theatre 
communist parties were “torn between the expediency of supporting 
[their] notionally backward constituency and […] doctrinal purity”—a 
conflict of mounting difficulty given the ever-increasing gap between 
class and caste concerns. 
 Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that the undivided CPI’s early 
history in colonial times is viewed somewhat differently. Radical 
functionalists apart there is a consensus that a mixture of zealous 
enthusiasm of the communist pioneers and a lack of unpleasant politi-
cal necessities concomitant with electoral imperatives—occasioned by 
both the party’s long-time illegality and the scarcity of elections—had 
enabled the CPI to pursue its anti-communal commitments much more 
consequently. For example, Irfan Habib (1998: 3) deems the commu-
nists’ vigorous struggle against communalism—especially in the closing 
days of the British Raj—an “epic chapter” of their colonial period. 
 However, little light has so far been shed on possible structural, that 
is, programmatic as against politically induced common ground be-
tween communism and communalism. The CPI’s ill-reputed support for 
the Pakistan demand in the mid-1940s forms the lone exception. Yet, 
(self-) criticism has largely bracketed out the episode from the party’s 
history, opting for its de-contextualisation as a situational aberration 
rather than looking for links to the programmatic foundations and 
traditions of the party. This line of criticism is not to pull into doubt 
either the communists’ secular merits or their sincerity in engaging 
communalism. It does, however, look for the conditions of the possi-
bility of common alignment long before (and topically independent 
from) the lurid pro-Pakistan period. Central to the understanding of 
such an alignment are the communist notions of what constitutes 


























and—perhaps most importantly—their approach to the proletariat and 
the ‘masses’. A proper situation of these enables one to grasp the 
contradictory and even downright ambivalent relationship of commu-
nism and communalism already in the colonial period. After tracing the 
problem down to the Marxist foundations of the party, I will demon-
strate this relationship on the CPI’s general theoretical meditations on 
the matter and two case examples: the 1926 Calcutta riots and the 
1929 riots among the Bombay workforce. 
Communist Responses: Theoretical Modalities 
How and on what grounds, then, did the Communist Party of India 
take up position towards the phenomenon of communalism? In order 
to approximate an answer, three fundamental circumstances have to 
be considered. First, the CPI was founded in Tashkent in 1920, and it 
took the party until the mid-1920s to establish cells in a number of 
locations in British India—mostly urban centres such as Bombay and 
Calcutta where factory workers were concentrated. Even beyond this 
point much of the party work continued to be done by communist 
émigrés in Europe, particularly Manabendra Nath Roy, founder of the 
CPI and its leading theorist. Hence, the communists were late-comers 
to the political theatre presented with the reality of more or less 
assertive communalism; and for the most part they lacked the 
organizational clout to stage effective interventions. Rather, they were 
reduced to the role of critical onlookers.  
 Second, behind the rigid doctrinal and idiomatic corset governing 
communist analyses the CPI was not a Marxist retort child, nor could it 
be. Its cadres, notably the first generation, without exception looked 
back on some sort of political activity or ideological imprint from before 
their turn to communism. Although their newly awoken enthusiasm for 
Marxism was sincere, they carried over various elements from their 
earlier political socialization. Roughly speaking, in the case of the early 
communists this socialization had taken place in one of three scena-
rios: The extremist wing of the swadeshi campaigns and concomitant 
underground terrorism, both with a marked Hindu tinge; some strand 
of Islamic anti-imperialism and related identity politics, especially the 
Khilafat Movement; and the Ghadr revolutionary nationalists who, 
while avowedly non-communal, exhibited few reservations towards 
mobilization on religious grounds. These heritages heavily influenced 



























 And third, in contrast to the more acute matters on the communist 
agenda—independence from British rule and organization of workers 
and peasants for militant class struggle ‘from below’—, there was very 
little theoretical or practical input from the mentors of Marxism on the 
matter of communalism. Neither Marx nor Engels nor Lenin had 
committed appreciable analytical energy beyond the more general 
matter of religion, nor did the supreme guiding body of international 
communist parties, the Moscow-based Communist International 
(Comintern). Therefore, the CPI found itself in the unfamiliar position 
of having to analyse this aspect of its environment on its own and 
apply Marxism accordingly. It had to develop its stances out of writings 
only indirectly related to communalism—meditations on religion and 
consciousness on the one hand, and the possible limits of class 
mobilization on the other. Both decisively moulded the CPI’s approach 
to communalism in terms of the low incidence of the communalist 
complex in the party’s publications and their analytical thrust alike.  
As far as Marxist philosophy is concerned, it thoroughly downgraded 
religion and related matters to secondary importance. However, right 
from his famous aphorisms in the Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy 
of Right characterising religion as the “opium of the people” Marx 
didn’t simply brush aside religion as irrelevant. Rather, there was a 
reason for its being an integral part of society. Marx considered this 
reason to be the fundamental invertedness, or false configuration of 
social relations. Religion, their “general theory”, their “logic in popular 
form”, was rooted in this invertedness and at the same time pointed to 
it: Religion “is at one and the same time the expression of real 
suffering and a protest against real suffering” (Marx [1844] 1961: 
378). Therefore, it was a wrong, because illusionary response; but it 
contained a grain of historical truth in that it pointed to real problems, 
namely oppression and economic misery. 
Subsequent Marxist thought emphasised notably the illusionary 
character of religion. In his crudish, but immensely popular division of 
society into “base” (production relations) and “superstructure” (every-
thing else), Engels underscored religion’s alleged fundamental insub-
stantiality by allotting it to the superstructure, denying it autonomous 
historical significance. From his studies on the Condition of the 
Working Classes in England ([1845] 1962: 352-3) he concluded that 
religion had also outlived its empirical significance for the prospective 
revolutionary subject. Religion among workers was “only nominal, not 
even theoretical”, clergymen were held in low esteem, and “among the 


























These realizations shaped the well-known passage in the Communist 
Manifesto stipulating that “the laws, morals, religion are to [the 
worker] bourgeois prejudices behind which hide as many bourgeois 
interests” (Marx & Engels [1848] 1990: 472). 
However, a lesser known early piece of Engels indicated that his 
notions of social progress were not at all incompatible with actual inci-
dence of religiousness. Based on travelogues describing Christian 
peasant communes in the USA he stated that only “irrational religion” 
(presumably as against a “rational” one) constituted an obstacle in the 
way of “communal living.” That the community school taught to read 
and write, but was averse to “sciences” didn’t matter to Engels. 
Neither did the fact that these “harmonists” had erected a “palace” for 
their priest to live in (Engels [1845] 1962: 522). Obviously, religion 
was more than mere bourgeois make-believe. Its social location 
mattered in its assessment—an important cue for subsequent gene-
rations of Marxists.  
Lenin, the great operationaliser of Marxism, took up and furthered 
Engels’s twofold thrust. Organised religion, belonging to the ‘bourgeois’ 
sphere of society, counted among the “instruments of bourgeois reac-
tion that serve to defend exploitation and to befuddle the working 
class” (Lenin [1909] 1968: 405). Here Lenin bent Marx’s famous quote 
almost to the point of declaring religion opium for the masses, admin-
istered by the cunning bourgeoisie. Accordingly, he had a clear view of 
interreligious strife: It was invariably fomented by interested bourgeois 
quarters to divert the ‘masses’ from the class struggle. 
With respect to popular religiousness the situation was somewhat 
different. Here religion, although itself “one of the forms of spiritual 
oppression which everywhere weighs down heavily upon the masses,” 
counted as no more than a “third-rate opinion […] rapidly being swept 
out as rubbish by the very course of economic development” (Lenin 
[1905] 1967: 71-2). But where other radical critics of religion such as 
Nietzsche called to push what was falling, Lenin opted for a remarkably 
non-conflicting approach: When dealing with their constituency 
communists were to avoid even the slightest injury to religious convic-
tions. What’s more, taking recourse to the world of religious terms, for 
example, in the case of an “agitator” using expressions “closest to the 
unenlightened mass” for mobilization purposes was a perfectly valid 
option for Lenin. Unsurprisingly, he regarded bourgeois anti-clericalism 
as just another device from the arsenal of distractions to confuse and 


























order to not create the impression of “overemphasis” of the struggle 
against religion (Lenin [1909] 1968: 412-14). 
What had to be emphasised, then, was the overthrow of capitalist 
relations of production. Of course this required the identification and 
localisation of revolutionary agency. Being the most disadvantaged 
section of society, Marx considered the factory workers—or prole-
tariat—to have the greatest material stake in revolutionary change. 
Therefore he expected them to lead the struggle against bourgeois 
society: They were the “only revolutionary class” and the bearers of 
revolutionary “proletarian consciousness” (Marx and Engels [1846] 
1969: 69). However, with the wisdom of hindsight—that is, with the 
experience of several decades of socialist worker mobilisation—Lenin 
came to repose comparably little faith in the innate revolutionary capa-
cities of the proletariat. In What Is to Be Done he opined that if left to 
themselves the workers would develop “trade-union consciousness” at 
best—”the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight 
the employers, and strive to compel the government to pass necessary 
labour legislation, etc.” Lenin’s answer to this realization was twofold. 
On the one hand, he conceived of an avant-garde party to help the 
proletariat develop a revolutionary consciousness: “Political conscious-
ness can be brought to the workers only from without.”1 The concept of 
a clique of professional revolutionaries mobilising and leading the 
proletariat—the future communist parties—was born. 
On the other, Lenin fatefully introduced a novel actor onto the 
revolutionary stage: The “masses.” Technically, they constituted the 
“majority”, comprising not only workers, but all “exploited” population 
segments. Lenin explicitly referred to the rural proletariat and poor 
peasants (Lenin [1921] 1982). Still, the term’s meaning and scope 
were generally remarkably vague. It provided a convenient way of 
referring to large, diffusely downtrodden sections of the population 
whose concrete identification would have invited disquieting investi-
gations into the adequacy of their inclusion in the revolutionary 
phalanx. This inclusion was problematic already on a conceptual plane 
because unlike the proletariat the ‘masses’ had not, or only partially, 
experienced the purifying ordeals of industrial modernization. 
Correspondingly, they had not undergone the concomitant radical 
reconfiguration of their not just material, but ideological predisposi-
tions.  
Yet, its vagueness together with its broad scope turned out advan-


























by the supplementary inclusion of ‘suppressed nations’ into the 
revolutionary struggle—rose steeply in a Leninist model of revolution, 
especially in non-European contexts. Henceforth, the task of the 
communist avant-garde consisted of “serving the masses and expres-
sing their correctly identified interests” (Lenin [1913] 1965: 400). As 
early as 1902 Lenin imagined the ideal social democrat as a “tribune of 
the people” rather than a petty trade union secretary (Lenin 1902). 
Shortly before the October Revolution, his historical optimism had 
blossomed into the conviction that “every popular movement” was to 
be utilised for the socialist project (Lenin [1916] 1960, 365-6). 
Accordingly, Marx’s original call to shed the ballast of the “traditions of 
all dead generations” became ever less realistic in proportion with the 
turn towards unspecified ‘masses’ (Marx [1852] 1962: 115). 
To sum it up, the CPI’s inherited theoretical armamentarium consis-
ted of a division of the religious complex into the deplorable, yet ulti-
mately irrelevant occurrence of mass religiousness versus dangerous 
religious institutions and bourgeois ‘diverters’ on the one hand, and an 
imperative emphasis on necessarily progressive mass struggle on the 
other. Of course, this distinction gave rise to serious issues concerning 
the approach to religious strife (or communalism). If religious, yet 
technically revolutionary ‘masses’ joined in a riot, had they gone over 
to the bourgeoisie? If not, were they merely hapless victims of 
bourgeois propaganda? Or did their participation even indicate the 
agency of subcutaneous class struggle and was hence innately 
progressive? With the first possibility out of the question from a 
communist point of view, the other two sketch out the spectrum in 
which communist responses materialised—and hence define the space 
for the involuntary interaction of communism and communalism. 
Colonial Modernity and Antagonistic Community Formation 
In a South Asian context, the term “communalism” broadly denotes 
attempts to construct religious or ethnic identity, incite strife between 
people identified as different communities, and to stimulate violence 
between them, often related to economic motives (Smith 1966; 
Horowitz 1985). In 1909, the poet Mohammed Iqbal referred to 
communalist currents as “unconscious trends of the two communities”, 
that is, the manifestation of various historical antagonisms in a highly 
dynamic and conflictual form (cit. in Ikram 1950: 174). Hence, 
communalism can be considered a medium of expressing unrealised 


























Engineer (1986: 16), an “ideologization of interests”. And yet, commu-
nalism is more than mere appearance, as Bipan Chandra has rightly 
cautioned: “Communal ideology has its own inner logic” (Chandra 
1986: 12). 
The conditions enabling religious communities—most prominently, 
Hindus and Muslims—to eventually become key agents in identity 
formation and articulation of political will alike developed notably in the 
last third of the nineteenth century. Until then, inter-communal ten-
sions had largely assumed the form of non-systematic outbursts in 
occasional violent clashes. The inevitable religious bias of monarchic 
rule in pre-colonial times had not necessarily fostered religious har-
mony. Yet, at least the rules were clear: One community was ‘in 
power’, the other was not. The possibility for fierce competition and 
ensuing systematic mutual alienation only arose when the British 
revolutionised governance by conducting it from a position of religious 
neutrality—while utilising religious divides to their own advantage. 
Fundamental economic and administrative changes together with the 
new importance of education suddenly opened up large fields for 
societal intervention. In the absence of other institutions of civil 
society, it was the communities as the most ‘natural’ and best orga-
nised instances of group formation that scrambled to fill up the new 
social spaces. 
British governance fostered this development by the tendency to 
recur, consciously (out of pragmatism) or not (out of orientalism), to 
religious communities and weave them into the fabric of the colonial 
public sphere at all levels. Matters as diverse as urban planning, 
employment in the public services, education, and political represen-
tation were all affected by varying communal bias ‘from above’. 
Influential sections among the respective communities eagerly 
reciprocated this compartmentalising trend. Phrasing a wide array of 
political and social aspirations—notably elite conflicts over appoint-
ments and jobs in the public services—in communal idioms became 
established practice during the heyday of the British Raj. These idioms 
hence acquired an increased sense of legitimacy. The resulting broad 
social process of communalization went a long way towards modern-
ising traditional religious loyalties. 
This modernization had a strong political component from the 
beginning. Religious communities became an early focal point in the 
formation of nationalist sentiment. Even though the mainstream 


























(INC), was a supra-religious body, it consisted overwhelmingly of 
Hindus. A growing sense of—partly self-inflicted—exclusion from the 
political arena prodded Muslim dignitaries to set up the Muslim League 
(ML) in 1906. Even though both organizations at times cooperated 
closely, the organizational seed for the 1947 partition of the 
subcontinent had been sown. The communalisation of politics, rein-
forced by the ascent of the Hindu Mahasabha, accelerated the gradual 
downward trend in Hindu-Muslim relations. 
Eventually, ‘All-India’ communities of Hindus and Muslims came to 
be defined and pitted against each other, not to mention the multitude 
of smaller regional communities. Pan-religious nationalism as preached 
by M. K. Gandhi during the non-cooperation movement undertook to 
integrate the major communal entities under the roof of the national 
movement. Yet, this approach entailed an affirmation of collective 
identities. Thus, Gandhi paid for a temporal bridge over the communal 
gap by deepening it. On the institutional side of things, the avenues for 
participation in politics and administration opened up by the 1919 
Government of India Act were constructed on the premises of separate 
electorates. Thus, they held major incentives for taking the short-cut 
through the communal quarter (Sarkar 1983: 156-8, 234). 
Following the suspension of non-cooperation, communal tensions 
erupted with renewed vigour. By the mid-1920s, mutual suspicion, 
aversion, and fierce competition dominated an increasingly commu-
nalised political and social setting. Rather than reconciliation, its 
general drive was to “reclaim ‘victims’ and protect the ‘faithful’” in the 
hangover after the failed common struggle for swaraj (Pandey 1990: 
233-4). Violent outbursts claiming hundreds of lives, as well as the 
upsurge of the shuddhi and sanghatan, and tabligh and tanzim move-
ments, respectively, bore testimony to the path community sentiments 
were going down. A series of abortive attempts of INC and ML to arrive 
at a common stance on a number of issues such as the constitutional 
set-up of an independent subcontinent, the extent of cooperation with 
the British, and even the thrust of political day-to-day demands led to 
a sustained political deadlock between both. 
Theoretic Shenanigans, or That which must not Be Cannot 
The upsurge in communal violence in one way or another grew into a 
concern of most political actors on the subcontinent. INC grandees 
Motilal Nehru and Abul Kalam Azad made plans for the formation of a 


























who were also members of communal organizations. In Bengal, 
Chittaranjan Das negotiated a pact between both communities for the 
sharing of employment opportunities in the public sector, and Gandhi 
protested against inter-communal violence with a widely publicised 
three-week fast in autumn 1924. Yet, these endeavours proved largely 
ineffective: The Nehru-Azad party never materialised, Das died shortly 
after the conclusion of his pact, which soon followed him into the 
grave, and Gandhi’s sincere but only momentarily effectual anti-
communal fasts and similar efforts did little to dispel long-term con-
stellations for conflict. 
The increase in violence and bitterness did not go unnoticed in 
communist quarters. Of course, the CPI viewed it as a most disquieting 
and unwelcome development. Yet, coming so soon after the non-
cooperation movement, whose successful cross-communal mobilization 
had presented a rosier picture of mass revolutionary potential, the 
renewed communal conflict initially had a hard time to penetrate into 
communist perceptions of their revolutionary subject. Still caught in 
the whirl of the post-war upsurge, they were loath to acknowledge the 
bleak reality of widespread religious rifts. At the same time, however, 
denouncing rising communalism as the ‘natural’ consequence of a 
faulty bourgeois protest movement also supported Roy’s earlier refusal 
to forge ties with leading non-co-operators.  
The analysis took shape accordingly: From the outset the fledgling 
CPI undertook to separate the communal divide from the spirit of 
protest—even the religious one—that had carried the movement. Roy’s 
own past as a terrorist brahmachari in Bengal and his resulting 
familiarity with religious resistancy contributed to his inclination to 
salvage the ‘resistive’ part of religious unrest. In June 1923, the first 
piece dedicated to the communal problem appeared in the CPI’s paper, 
the Vanguard of Indian Independence (henceforth Vanguard). It 
contrasted the “helpless” undertakings of political leaders to contain 
the growing communal tensions by well-meaning appeals with a 
straightforward analysis that exonerated the plebeian participants: 
“Communal rivalry is fomented by the upper classes of both the 
communities, and the Government always stands behind the scene” 
(“Communal Conflict and the Congress”, Vanguard, 1 June 1923; Ray 
1998). The solution lay in exposing intra-communal class conflicts 



























Under bourgeois auspices, however, conflicts around injured 
communal sentiments would never cease. Hence, India would never be 
free, as the violent rifts played “into the hands of imperialism”—appa-
rently the biggest problem Roy could identify with relation to the riots. 
In itself, this was not a product of his imagination. (Pro-) British and 
conservative newspapers were ever quick to question the viability and 
reasonability of subcontinental self-government upon the outbreak of 
communal riots. Nevertheless, Roy’s interpretation of the issue on 
purely political grounds showcased two fundamental characteristics of 
his view: First that the problematic of communalism was not religious; 
and second that he regarded neither the anti-libertine and socially 
conservative character of communal assertions, nor even their often 
considerable aggression per se as overly disturbing. 
This approach also informed the Manifesto on the Hindu-Moslem 
Unity and Swaraj. Published in the Vanguard in October 1923, it is one 
of the most programmatic and most often-cited communist texts on 
the issue to date. The pamphlet summarily blasted the non-coope-
ration movement for the prominent role religion had played in it—yet, 
typically, not without crediting it for creating “some sort of political 
consciousness among the […] masses of India” (“Manifesto”, 
Vanguard, 1 October 1923). This consciousness itself was apparently 
not worthy of further scrutiny. Under the prevailing circumstances, a 
thorough investigation into what exactly passed as progressive 
“political consciousness” might have turned out overly disappointing 
for Roy. In this light, his allegation that the upsurge in religious 
conflicts testified to the “essentially reactionary character” only of 
bourgeois politicians was consequential rather than plausible: The 
Hindu and Muslim ‘masses’ had been artificially distracted from their 
actual unity on class grounds and had fallen victim to cunning oper-
ationalisers of religion:  
The consciousness of [their] union is interfered with by large 
doses of conflicting religious dogma administered by interested 
parties. Religious propaganda is an indigenous method of 
exploitation of the ignorant masses by the able doctors of 
Divinity. (ibid.)  
The latter’s apparent ability to shape the “ignorant masses” at will and 
Roy’s concomitant call to nationalist middle-class intellectuals to simply 
“replace the religious propaganda and metaphysical abstractions by 
economic slogans to make the masses conscious” both indicated the 


























India. Acknowledging religion, including religious conflicts, as “opium 
of the masses”, that is, as an integral component of society apparently 
was too compromising for the communist vision. In order to save these 
‘masses’ from the communal odour (and, thus, for the communist 
project), Roy instead reduced sociability to emanations from the 
privileged. Also, incapacitating the broad population as “ignorant 
masses”, while questionable from a Marxist point of view, made sense 
from a biographical perspective, as Roy could fall back on his elitist 
outlook from the olden days of Hindu underground terrorism.  
Ultimately, he saw little reason to worry for the time being. Roy 
considered tensions between the communities “less serious” compared 
to “other defects in the programme, ideology and organization of the 
nationalist movement.” Also, “theological politics” were essentially 
alien to the movement for national liberation, which was following its 
own messianic teleology: The “inevitable and inexorable” development 
of nationalism on “purely secular” lines would by itself obliterate 
communalism, and revolutionary nationalism even was “the deadly 
enemy of communalism” (“Unity”, Vanguard, 15 November 1924). In 
view of the general readiness of most contemporary ‘revolutionary 
nationalists’ in- and outside the subcontinent to employ religious and 
even communal motives in their struggle for independence, this was a 
remarkable claim. The integrality of religious notions to the outlook of 
Roy’s own former comrades-in-arms, the Anushila terrorists, is parti-
cularly striking. What bridged the gap and enabled him to distil 
revolutionary merit from fundamentalist religious struggle was his 
socialization in their sub-cosmos and, hence, his close familiarity with 
their brand of ‘revolutionariness’. 
From the outset, Anushilites figured prominently among those whom 
Roy sought to recruit for communism. His comrades on the subconti-
nent exhibited similar leanings towards their respective home turf. 
Sripad Amrit Dange in Bombay, for example, was as great an admirer 
of the Hindu-tinged extremist nationalism of Bal Ganghadar Tilak’s 
swadeshi campaigns as an opponent of the khilafat movement. Hence, 
it is no surprise that his patron during his early steps towards socialism 
and communism was Ranchoddas Bhavan Lotvala, an ex-Arya Sama-
jist (Yajnik 1952, chapters 3 and 4). And if Roy’s advances towards the 
Bengal Hindu terrorists met with vocal opposition from Muzaffar 
Ahmad of the predominantly Muslim CPI cell in Calcutta, the latter 
could boast of excellent connections to radical Muslim anti-imperialists 
(WBIB File 67/24 SL 105/1924: n.p.; Mukhopadhyay 1997: 198-201; 


























Even apart from such tendencies, Roy’s criticism of interreligious 
strife was principled only to the extent that he acknowledged 
communalism as a thing-in-itself—or, in communist vocabulary, princi-
pled only in a subjective, not in an objective sense. While his inter-
ventions doubtlessly formed one of the most radical and at the same 
time most analytic critiques of its time, the tendency to confine 
communalism to the influence of imperialism and the upper social 
strata clearly exhibited blind spots towards religious militancy. His 
advances towards the Bengali revolutionary terrorists form only one of 
many examples (others being the 1921 Mapilla rebellion and the early 
Akali movement) for the viability of revolutionary communalism in a 
communist framework. Non-revolutionary, that is, neither anti-colonial 
nor—however mildly—anti-propertied classes communalism, on the 
other hand, was exactly the kind of communalism that couldn’t be 
accepted as part of mass consciousness if the latter was to remain an 
addressee for the communist vision. 
Therefore, Roy clung to the conspiratorial character of such non-
revolutionary communalism. While the subcontinent was the best 
example that religion was indeed the opium of the people, “the 
virulence of this kind of opium-poisoning in the body-politic of India 
[…] shows” not the critical state of popular consciousness, but merely 
“to what extent the dealers of this dope have been active” ("The 
Hindu-Muslim Problem”, Masses of India, April 1925). Roy deflected 
the challenge to progressive notions of mass consciousness inherent in 
the contemporary communalised set-up philosophically and empiri-
cally. Philosophically by fashioning religion into ‘opium for the masses’ 
for all intents and purposes; and empirically by shifting the proble-
matic into a separate mercenary sub-cosmos where those who actually 
participated in riots were merely “the scum of society, which cannot be 
said to possess any sincere religious fanaticism” (“Unity”, Vanguard, 
15 November 1924).  
In this reasoning not even the most vociferous and violent 
proponents of communal antagonism counted as true fanatics. They 
were just paid agents of the propertied classes. Yet, even such an 
approach did not necessarily remove communist uncertainties, and 
even less did it prove sustainable. Just as Roy had criticised the inclu-
sion of communal unity in the INC’s list of prerequisites for swaraj in 
1924 (as this paid undue homage to an artificial conflict), he advo-
cated the opposite only a year later when he attacked the veteran 
nationalist and Hindu Mahasabhite Lala Lajpat Rai for denying the 


























To be sure, Roy was not the only architect of this theoretical edifice. 
Contemporary communist opinion concurred with the thrust of his 
analyses. For example, Rajani Palme Dutt, a leading theoretician of the 
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), confirmed Roy’s positions in 
his immensely influential 1926 oeuvre Modern India. If anything, he 
was even less convinced of any autonomous ideological content of 
communalism, and more optimistic that the laws of historical materi-
alism would ensure the proper (that is, communist) course of history. 
While Dutt castigated the bourgeoisie for fishing for “all kinds of cults 
and superstitions of barbarism, ignorance, submission to God, etc., in 
order to spread these among the masses”, the attempts at influencing 
the latter were ultimately in vain: It was “idle to believe that this 
fashionable make-believe can have the slightest effect on the real 
processes at work” (Dutt 1926: 123-4). However, subsequent events 
on the subcontinent would cast an eerie light on these “real pro-
cesses”. Through his meditations, Roy had prepared the ground for 
their conditioned acceptance within a communist framework. The 
following sections will discuss the implementation by ‘communists on 
the spot’ on the basis of two examples: The 1926 Calcutta riots and 
the 1929 riots in Bombay. 
The Domestic Response I: Calcutta 1926 
Roy’s writings on communalism had developed under the condition of 
the considerable spatial and temporal distance of his European abode 
to the actual manifestations of communal consciousness. In contrast, 
communists on the subcontinent were more directly confronted with 
the virulence of communal assertions. This led to differences in its 
assessment: Evidently annoyed by Roy’s reluctance to recognize the 
magnitude of the problem, the Socialist published an open letter to 
Roy from J. P. Begerhotta, member of the INC Working Committee and 
future short-time CPI party secretary, in September 1924. It empha-
sised that “all efforts should be made to abolish religious influence 
from the people. Hindu Muslim unity cannot be successful until every 
body is well fed and religious bigotry is removed” (cit. in Communist 
Party of India [Marxist] 2005: 81). This tells of a more immediate 
exposure to the “real processes at work”, an exposure that reached its 
tentative climax of intensity in the 1926 Calcutta riots. The ensuing 
process of theoretical churning on the part of the local communists 


























Simmering tensions in the city had erupted in early April in attacks 
by Muslims on Marwari traders before the background of a long-term 
downward trend in inter-communal relations. In Bengal, assertions of 
communal identity during the non-cooperation movement and notably 
the inter-communal rivalry for participation in the political and admin-
istrative spheres had lastingly affected the traditionally quiet (if not 
amicable) coexistence of the two big communities for the worse. Not 
only the bhadralok, the Bengali Hindu middle-class, that was faced 
with Muslim competition for jobs in the public services and felt increas-
ingly threatened in its elite position had embarked on a sustained 
process of communalization. The influx of work migrants from more 
communalised areas on the upper Ganges had introduced another 
volatile element into the city. The early abrogation of Das’ Hindu-
Muslim Pact for the sharing of seats in the administration and public 
employment, and communal overtones in the campaigns for the 
approaching elections for the Legislative Council had also contributed 
to an atmosphere of tension. 
Not uncommonly for the time, the riots originated in an Arya Samaj 
procession playing music in front of a mosque during Ramadan. What 
happened in several episodes during the following month, however, 
constituted the worst colonial India had seen of communal violence in 
decades. Over a hundred people died, almost two-thirds of them in the 
first couple of days alone. Besides religious buildings, the rioters of 
both communities also attacked numerous houses and shops. Regular 
troops had to be called in to restore order (see Dutta 1990). 
Faced with the frenzy, the Calcutta communists around Muzaffar 
Ahmad reedited the Manifesto on the Hindu-Muslim Unity and Swaraj 
and distributed it as one of the few voices of religious neutrality in the 
city’s highly charged communal atmosphere. Ahmad therefore had 
considerable trouble to have it printed, even though the Manifesto’s 
editors avoided open anti-religious criticism, just as its authors had 
done. Besides theoretical reasons (namely the desire to classify reli-
gious phenomena as ephemeral), more tangible considerations had 
also influenced such carefulness. After all, open criticism of religion 
had meant inviting trouble: Earlier in the same year, the renowned 
lawyer and author Abul Hussain had publicly accused Abdul Kader, a 
student activist of the communist-led Workers’ and Peasants’ Party, of 
offending Muslim sentiments and emphatically warned him not to do so 
henceforth. Although Kader’s ‘transgressions’ had been rather mild and 


























ed the rebuttal (WBIB File 320/26 SL 310/1926: n.p.; Chattopadhyay 
2011: 166).  
Confronted, then, with the choice to either attack “third-rate ideas” 
(Lenin) and risk influence in a society dominated by them, or 
acquiesce and tailor political ambitions to the conditions dictated by 
the environment, domestic communism clearly went with the latter 
option. However, this did not happen discreetly. As in the case of Mus-
lim anti-colonialism of the early 1920s, the Calcutta communists took 
the bull by the horns and undertook to appropriate the ideological 
status quo for the communist project.  
In the political constellation of 1926, this was no implausible move. 
With Gandhi focusing on his “Constructive Work”, militant nationalism 
was on a long-time low, and Jawarhalal Nehru’s efforts to revive non-
cooperation and satyagraha began in earnest only in 1927. Even then, 
successes were limited to paper politics: The INC’s association to the 
League Against Imperialism and the moving of a resolution at the 
Madras Congress session demanding complete independence were not 
suited to spawn a broad movement against British rule. Sourandra 
Mohan Ganguly derisively comments that the INC at that time had 
transformed into a “spinning association”—a fitting assessment even 
though it overlooks the deep-rooted social entrenchment that “con-
structive work” brought about over the course of time (Ganguly 1984: 
59-61; Joshi 1992). Yet, this long-term strategy hardly was a factor in 
the faster cycles of communist political activity. Accordingly, the 
Manifesto closed with a blazing call to take the fight to the rich, who 
after all were responsible for the predominance of religious ideology: 
Fatalism, fanaticism, submission, superstition, obedience and 
faith, the offsprings of religion, are the offensive weapons in the 
hands of the oppressors; poverty, miseries, self-renunciation, 
sacrifices are the consoling factors ordained by religion for the 
poor and oppressed. Our rich people […] are committing daily 
highest treason in broad day and tormenting the poor by invoking 
the aid of God. (WBIB File 35/26 SL 2/1926: 64-5) 
This conclusion carried a meaning significantly different from the 
original Manifesto’s. The 1926 Calcutta outbreak had been incompa-
rably larger in scope and magnitude than the riots of 1923. The latter 
had been more akin to isolated occurrences and could, with some 
stretch of imagination, more plausibly be traced to small groups of 
instigators. In Calcutta, however, considerable population segments 


























local communists. Hence, in its context the reprint signalled not a 
reaffirmation, but a departure from Roy’s dominant understanding of 
communalism, which regarded the matter as an entirely bourgeois 
affair and hence comprehensively rejected its manifestations. Rather, 
the Calcutta communists undertook to pass the riots as ‘revolutionary 
communalism’, that is, as a social movement concealed by a religious 
misnomer, just as Roy had done in the case of the Mapilla rebellion 
and the Akali Sikhs. Ahmad’s comment in Langal (“Plough”), the 
Bengal Peasants’ and Workers’ Party’s organ, during the worst days of 
rioting spelled out the shift: 
The upper strata of society have all along been plundering the 
lower ones. The looting which has to-day taken place in Calcutta 
under the thin cover of Hindu-Moslem dissension, is but the 
reaction from that spoliation. The matter for regret is that, the 
affair has floated before our eyes tinges with [sic!] a religio-
communal line. (Langal, 9 April 1926, in PCJ 1926/48: n.p.; 
emphasis added) 
Here Ahmad harked back to the radical strand in Roy’s positions that 
had affirmed community-centred mass action in the wider Mapilla and 
Akali contexts. In 1926, however, there was much less in terms of a 
mass movement to latch onto—except for widespread manifestations 
of communalism. Moreover, as the (from a communist point of view) 
most pressing question of class had not lost its urgency, Ahmad simply 
declared it the driving force behind large-scale manifestations of 
communal unrest. Where Roy had called to foreground issues of class 
and thus aimed at side-lining communal themes, Ahmad’s approach 
emphasised direct linkages between communal manifestations and 
progressive aspirations. Thereby communalism acquired a double 
meaning: ‘From above’, it cemented the position and increased the 
bargaining power of a section of upper classes while at the same time 
weakening the unity of the underprivileged. ‘From below’, however, it 
indicated a state of dispossession and depravity, and hence contained 
the drive to combat the conditions providing for dispossession. Ahmad 
even argued that the charge of communalism was the last straw of the 
possessing classes to portray themselves as victims of the just class 
rage of the underdogs. Even though not consciously rebelling against 
class rule, the subalterns were performing acts of social desperation 
indicative of an unfulfilled desire to be free (ibid.; Chattopadhyay 
2011, 246-8). 
This was a potent radicalisation of Roy’s approach and at the same 


























of the masses”. The phrase had vented his conviction that religion 
pointed to social relations necessitating its existence as the “heart of a 
heartless world”. In contrast to Roy’s externalising take on 
communalism, the Calcutta riots had forcefully impressed on the local 
communists the integrality of religious notions to subcontinental 
politics. However, rather than rejecting it as an ideology they associ-
ated its violent assertion in the shape of a communal outbreak with the 
struggle against dominant social relations. Obviously, the experience 
of the riots had shattered the canonical approach of treating commu-
nalism and its perpetrators as alien to society’s mainstay. The Calcutta 
group had realised that a communist perspective had to evolve new 
responses to the fact that communal terror had emanated not only 
from isolated gangs of paid goondas but also from the ‘masses’ 
themselves. Furthermore, it seems that in the absence of a broad 
political movement communalism was the closest approximation to 
social or even revolutionary militancy—bearing in mind Lenin’s injunc-
tion to “utilize every popular movement” for the cause of socialism. 
Declaring communalism a misguided class struggle was consequential 
and advantageous. Thereby Ahmad could achieve both: being honest 
in paying homage to the actual state of the mass psyche and still claim 
its agents for the communist project. The new responses of the 
Calcutta communists adapted the old imperatives of mass politics to 
the peculiar environment on the subcontinent.  
All this is not to imply that communists supported or even were 
directly involved in communal propaganda, let alone atrocities. Nor 
were they perceived to do so, which adversely affected their reputation 
in both communities. In fact, there was not much the communists 
could do except for writing against the riots even where they were 
comparably well-organised. Nevertheless, the sympathetic understand-
ing of the riots as a social phenomenon directly growing out of class 
constellations indicated that communal radicalism was not necessarily 
opposed to a communist agenda. The oftentimes close proximity of 
class conflict and communal rioting undercut a clear distinction 
between both, which facilitated the latter’s indirect appropriation. 
Against this background, attributing the failure to effectively combat 
communalism to organisational deficiencies alone merely reiterates 
traditional left assumptions of a strict dichotomy of neatly separated 
‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary’ forms of consciousness, and ignores the 
active role of communist instances in the amalgamation of these 


























In contrast, Roy’s reaction to the riots initially reiterated his 
externalising paradigm through an elaborate “class analysis” of the 
communal phalanx. According to him, it consisted of a “parasitic class 
of priests”, reactionary politicians, the unemployed intelligentsia and 
petty bourgeois traders (both of which faced increasing competition 
from Muslims), and “lumpen-proletariat and goondas […] used by the 
police to start the affray.” Behind them was the “hidden hand of 
imperialism.” All of these groups had political and material stakes in 
sustained communal campaigns, and hence inflamed the widespread 
“discontent in the name of religion”. However, Roy’s theoretical efforts 
at containment obviously could not dispel his own rising doubts about 
the inherent integrity of mass action. His concerns were reflected in 
the new tasks of the CPI. Henceforth, it was to expose communal 
plotters, fight radical Hinduism and extremist Islam alike, and liberate 
the population from religious fanaticism and “traditional social evils” 
(“The Communal Strife”, Masses of India, October 1926). 
Yet, Roy also had a more seminal approach in store. As he probably 
himself sensed the ultimate inadequateness of his externalising 
paradigm, Roy also introduced a concept that would unfold the true 
power of its appeal only much later, in the CPI’s policies from the late 
1930s onwards. As early as March 1926 he had outlined a communist 
minimum program demanding, inter alia, a “guarantee for national 
minorities” and envisaging a “solution of the communal question on 
the basis of democratic rights” (Communist Party of India [Marxist] 
2005: 95). Without further explanation the exact meaning of these 
formulae had remained obscure. Two months later, however, the 
events in Calcutta had obviously initiated a process of churning. A 
guest column by a Soviet trade union leader in the Masses of India 
criticised the INC for conceding “inordinate importance” to issues of 
religion and its erroneous quest for a compromise, for “essentially the 
question was a question of national minority” (“The Calcutta Riot”, 
Masses of India, May 1926). 
This plank of thought, even while it was of little resonance for the 
time being, seemed to present a workable solution of the communal 
problem on communist terrain and in communist terms—foremost 
because it allowed for an analysis of the communalist phenomenon 
that paid due homage to the involvement of the “masses” without 
raising the need for their criticism. After all, “national minority” was a 
valid category in a communist frame of reference. The idea appealed 
sufficiently to Roy to include it in the CPI’s manifesto to the 1926 INC 


























the interests of national minorities. Roy’s weak reference to the super-
ficiality and artificiality of communal boundaries did not forestall their 
acknowledgement and operationalisation in national terms—not even 
by Roy himself: With clear cultural overtones, the programmatic sec-
tion demanded that “one of the main planks in the nationalist platform 
must be the protection for national and communal minorities” (cit. in 
Basu et al. 1997a: 333).  
Hence, the diverging responses of Roy and the Calcutta communists 
grew out of a common denominator. While the Calcutta communists 
sought to appropriate communal conflicts in terms of class struggle, 
Roy tried the same from a cultural vantage point. Both constituted 
endeavours to come to grips with the unsavoury effectivity of commu-
nalism while avoiding its implications for the communist agenda. These 
implications would have consisted in a readjustment of the thrust of 
communist activity towards a committed acknowledgement of the 
virulent communal outlook with all necessary consequences. Yet, as 
the imperatives of national independence and socialism were undis-
putable the communal reality had to be adapted to communist theory 
instead of the other way round. In both cases, this served to soften 
the antagonism, and to an extent blur the boundaries between 
communism and communalism. 
The Domestic Response II: Proletarian Communalism 
Notwithstanding their tentative appropriation as proto-revolutionary 
force, the streak of communal riots peaking in the Calcutta bloodshed 
had to an extent eroded the CPI’s zeal for mass politics—and 
underscored its inability to intervene effectively in the broad political 
arena. They accelerated the turn towards the communist core consti-
tuency that as a social stratum was as unstained from the communal 
odour as conspicuously absent from communist theorising yet: The 
working class. Systematic communist efforts to organize workers and 
set up a ‘red’ trade union movement began in the mid-1920s, also as a 
consequence of Comintern pressure and subsequent support from the 
CPGB. 
Together with the mill areas along the Hooghly, it was Bombay that 
developed into an early hub of communist activity. The local 
communist group around Shantaram Savlaram Mirajkar, Sachchida-
nand Vishnu Ghate, and Dange successfully organised workers and led 
them in strikes. Occasional government repression such as a raid on 


























its reputation as sales went up appreciably afterwards. However, it was 
through the momentous victory in the general strike of Bombay’s 
textile workers from April to October 1928 that communist labour 
activity shot to real prominence and fame. The strike prevented major 
wage cuts and was marked by considerable tenacity and discipline on 
the part of the strikers, who were organised in grass-root mill commit-
tees, resisted all attempts to break the strike, and joined the 
communist Girni Kamgar (Red Flag) Union (GKU) in scores (Sarkar 
1983: 271; Chandavarkar 1997: 102). 
To the Bombay communists, the strike confirmed the correctness of 
their political line and bolstered the hopes they put into the subconti-
nent’s working class. The cross-communal rejection of the offer of 
Shaukat Ali, head of the local khilafat committee, to provide strike 
funds only for Muslim workers strengthened communist trust. Kranti’s 
message that the distinction between “Hindu or Musalman […] does 
not exist in the law of loot of capitalism”2 seemed to stick (see also 
Basu et al. 1997b: 1154; Dange 1979: 112-3). In early 1929, the GKU 
was the strongest, most prestigious, and best-organised trade union in 
Bombay, enjoying support far beyond the textile workers. The commu-
nal riot of February 1929 burst into this communist success story. 
Its prelude had taken place in mid-January: Striking oil workers had 
attacked Muslim Pathan blacklegs. The Pathans had not only repelled 
the assailants, but pursued them to their quarters, where they had 
attacked and looted indiscriminately. In the aftermath, rumours that 
the Pathans were kidnapping children quickly spread among Hindu 
workers, leading to a proletarian “man hunt for Pathans” on 3 February 
that left two dead. On 4 February, the unrest spread to the mill area, 
where over 30,000 workers had struck work, armed themselves, and 
commenced another “regular man hunt for Pathans”.3 On the following 
day, the municipal government called in the army to restore order. 
Khilafat leader Mohamed Ali displayed considerable anger at the labour 
leaders, particularly Dange and Nimbkar, and accused them of not 
doing enough to dispel the false rumours against Pathans. His brother 
Shaukat announced the organisation of “Muslim self-defence”. Unsur-
prisingly, it was soon Hindu workers who were “battered to death” 
(Times of India, 6 February 1929). The latter however did their best to 
even out the balance: A large crowd, originally having resumed work, 
responded to malicious rumours with striking work anew and rushing 
out to seek revenge. Speeches at strikers’ meetings had again roused 
many against supposed Pathan kidnappers (Times of India, 7 February 


























total, over a hundred deaths were recorded in the course of just over a 
week. 
The communist response was unequivocal and from the outset clung 
to an externalising pattern. Dange ever maintained that the “imperial-
ists and their agents [had] decided to involve […] the whole city in a 
furious communal rioting” (Dange 1979: 237). The imposition of a 
curfew and the efforts to nail down the culprits were a mere “smoke-
screen” to obscure the true originators of the disturbances—the 
“agent-provocateurs who had directed the huge crime of a communal 
strife” (ibid.: 242). Among them counted Shaukat Ali, “who, once an 
anti-imperialist [on the merits of his khilafat past], is now the active 
paid agent of imperialism, planted in the bourgeois national movement 
to disrupt it by communal dissensions” (ibid.: 253). Similarly, Mirajkar 
remained convinced that the riots had been “deliberately staged by the 
British Government” (Mirajkar 1974: 85-6). Fellow communist Bhal-
chandra Trimbak Ranadive traced the disturbances to the British 
administration’s desire to attack the “powerful arm of the working 
class” by using provocateurs to engineer a “serious Hindu-Muslim riot 
to smash the class solidarity of the working class” (Ranadive 1992: 
15).  
As for the reasons for unleashing the bloodshed, Dange mentioned 
the GKU’s strength and the intention of the mill-owners to pay back 
the workers for the successful 1928 general strike. At the same time, 
he insisted that the working class had remained impervious to these 
instigations. There never had been “any kind of virile communal feeling 
among the workers. Though they nominally classify themselves by 
religion and caste, the Bombay workers are exceptionally free from the 
Hindu-Muslim feeling.” They had become “class-conscious and not 
caste-conscious” over the course of time, as demonstrated by their 
record of united struggle (Dange 1979: 242). Obviously, the almost 
verbal recourse to Engels’ “Condition of the Working Classes” served to 
fortify Dange’s trust in the Bombay workforce, and strengthen his 
resolve to write off the unpleasant fact that ‘his’ workers had indulged 
in religious frenzy. 
Still, even Dange’s account had to admit the unadmittable. Ulti-
mately, it had been only communist intervention that had prevented 
the workers “from being excited into a suicidal fury” (Basu et al. 
1997b: 1270). While the efforts of labour leaders on the spot to stop 
the riots are beyond doubt, this was a shaky claim. Other passages 


























“rioting was never serious in the workers’ locality”, or more clearly, 
that the GKU had undertaken everything in its power “to stop the mad 
fury that had possessed the people. We issued every day one or two 
handbills, telling them of the great harm they were doing to their class 
by such action” (ibid.: 1278-9, emphasis added). Even eventual 
success (“the temporary communal deviation was checked and correc-
ted by the G.K.U.”) renders his claim of an “inherent superior prole-
tariat morality of the workers” (ibid: 1280) doubtful at the very least. 
In Ghate’s recollection, a lone example of admitting uncertainty and 
personal experience into the picture, this “morality” takes more con-
crete shape: 
One day such a situation was created that we did not know what 
to do: [the workers] became very militant. The same people 
came with dandas [sticks]. They said that they wanted to kill 
some Muslims […] The workers would not go back [to work] 
because all sorts of rumours were being spread. (Ghate 1970: 
53-5).  
At least with the reflective distance of several decades, Ghate’s per-
ception was acute enough to acknowledge not only disturbances 
between Hindu and Muslim workers, but also that they had been 
“provoked by the workers themselves, not by the management” (ibid: 
57-8). The latter had sought to maintain peace and keep production 
going. Diplomatically ambiguous, British communist Clemens Dutt 
summarised in late 1929 that the events of 1928-9 had left “no ground 
for uncertainty as to the advance of the revolutionary tide there” (Dutt 
1929: 741). 
Apparently, the “great harm” Dange spoke of had been done to 
communist notions of the working class no less than anything else. The 
outbreak dismayed the Bombay activists, who felt the need to support 
the best in ‘their’ workers against empirical evidence. After all, the 
same workforce had achieved a resounding victory in the general 
strike just a few months before. This incredulity explains the contra-
dictory fashion of coupling the outsourcing of a disagreeable fact (a 
riot with worker participation) to social adversaries with its outright 
denial. The inconsistency also bore out the degree of desperation. 
After the loss of revolutionary immersion with the ‘masses’, the 
working class was the only remaining bulwark of communist hopes. 
Hence, they had chosen to chain themselves to their object of agita-
tion. Mirajkar later named this fateful bond: “Whatever Tata may say, 
he is always wrong, whatever worker says, he is always right” (Miraj-


























The 1929 riot, then, was a tough nut to swallow for the communists. 
The workers had obviously not been right when they joined in the fray; 
yet, they were indispensable as an anchor for progressive politics. 
Communist rationalisations hence undertook to absolve the proletariat 
as far as remotely plausible by separating unbecoming mind-sets from 
their physical agents. Although such a separation was only theoretical 
and predictably had little tangible effect on the outlook of the workers, 
it was indispensable for continued communist fondness for the working 
class. Due to latter's central position in Marxist coordinates, the 
sobering effect communal manifestations had yielded with regard to 
the ‘masses’—that is, the turn towards other population sections—
never materialised in a working class context. The externalising para-
digm, having passed the Bombay stress test without breaking in the 
face of empirical evidence, remained the standard formula vis-à-vis 
communal unrest for much of the future. For example, Dutt main-
tained even just before partition that “hooliganism always arises from 
above, and never from below” (Dutt 1946: 217). Thus, a consequent 
‘shifting’ of communalism effectively worked to neutralize the anti-
communal edge of the communist agenda. 
Closing Thoughts 
Contrary to what could be gleaned from Marxism’s atheist façade, the 
communist handling of communalism did not follow a unitarily 
dismissive pattern. Being an integral part of the British Indian political 
landscape, communalism’s significance even for communist politics 
was a given. Even where strict delineations prevailed it turned out 
impossible to sever all its connections and linkages to the area of 
communist activity. Three factors decisively determined this unfeasi-
bility. First, the pre-established, pervading virulence of communal 
thought patterns upon the inception of the CPI. Second, the biographi-
cal ideological ballast of individual communists that let certain asser-
tions of communalism appear as less problematic than others. Third, 
the thrust of communist grand policy that left more than one backdoor 
for religion and communalism. Hence, they asserted themselves 
implicitly (as in the case of the “class-conscious” Bombay workers) or 
explicitly (as in the tentative patronisation of communal protest poten-
tial) in a communist framework. 
Again, it has to be stressed that the communists were exceedingly 
committed, at least subjectively. They rejected tactical compromises 


























opportunities to voice their opposition to religious and communal 
politics and outlooks. In contrast to most other contemporaries on the 
political stage, their assessments of communalism did not originate 
from moralism. Roy’s analyses were innovative in their context in that 
they undertook to ground the phenomenon in social and political 
constellations, and provided a materialist explanation of motivations 
and interests in communal mobilisation. 
However, narrowing communalism to ulterior motives of certain elite 
factions led to its sustained de-ideologisation. E. M. S. Namboodiri-
pad’s later praise of Roy, according to which his grounding of the 
religious question in the class struggle had been as seminal as the 
solutions he had offered, acquires its proper meaning less in a theo-
retical sense (as Roy did not transcend established Marxist formulae) 
than in a historical one (Namboodiripad 1997: 3-4). Both an areligious 
understanding of communalism and the blaming of problematic 
aspects of religion onto communalism remain characteristic of the 
communist position. Roy’s problematisation of communalism as a mere 
means rather than as an end in itself has paved the way for an under-
standing of communalism as an essentially imperialist and reactionary 
technique—an understanding that, in the meantime, has become 
entrenched in subcontinental communism.  
At the same time, the excesses of communalism coupled with the 
absence of a broad protest movement rendered simple, externalising 
models of explanation untenable if a communist perspective for 
intervention was to be maintained. The ensuing process of theoretical 
churning yielded different results. First, the Calcutta communists 
responded to ‘their’ riots with a qualified elevation of communalism. 
They considered its connotation of militant social unrest not as a 
substantiation of, but rather the best surrogate for national or class 
struggle to be had in the mid-1920s. Second, Roy made tentative 
steps towards an understanding of communalism as a problem of 
national minorities, whose momentousness for communist theory 
would manifest itself in the late 1930s. And third, a re-orientation set 
in from unspecified mass politics towards a clearer identification of 
target population segments. In this context, communist efforts at 
definition and organisation turned towards the proletariat—whose own 
communal encumbrance the communists gave their best to write off, 
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